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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce production and the resale problem into the general equilibrium model
with asymmetric information proposed by Dubey et al. (2000, 2005). We found that the exogenous
delivery upper bound is a crucial assumption for market equilibrium and optimality problems.
Importantly, the typical equilibrium allocation of an asymmetric information economy is directly
related to the exogenous upper bounds. Hence, to consider market viability problems, we extended
the model by introducing an apparatus that expresses the natural costs of the market delivery, so
that the delivery upper bounds are determined endogenously.
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1 Introduction
Informational asymmetry problems have been traditionally treated using static partial equilibrium
arguments (e.g., Akerlof (1970), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)). The approaches of Dubey et al. (2005)
are groundbreaking general equilibrium treatments for asymmetric information problems.1 Dubey et
al. (2005) discussed, in the context of asset markets, how a certain system of pooled insurance may
solve equilibrium-existence problems in a default economy. In their model, as a buyer, every agent
obtains an average receipt (including defaults) in each asset market. As sellers, they can choose not
to deliver their full obligations. If we consider the rational expectation equilibrium (i.e., expect to
obtain an average), the default problem may not harm the existence of a market equilibrium, i.e., the
market viability problem is solved armatively under the seller{buyer informational asymmetry. Several
researchers have investigated this seller{buyer informational asymmetry using a general competitive
equilibrium model. Bisin and Gottardi (1999) considered a similar problem to Dubey et al. (2005), in
the probabilistic and dynamic setting. Bisin et al. (2011), Correia-da-Silva (2012), and Meier et al.
(2014) are the most recent to consider a static setting.2 Bisin et al. (2011) considered the situation
where agents only have ner information (than the market) when they are sellers. However, Correia-da-
Silva (2012) and Meier et al (2014) considered the situation where agents also have ner information as
buyers, such that the information varies among agents. From this perspective, the methods are called
one-sided and two-sided models. In this paper, we investigate a general equilibrium model with one-
sided informational asymmetry. We use a similar approach to Dubey et al. (2000, 2005) and Bisin et al.
(2011), because their approaches and models are natural from the view point of a standard extension of
the Arrow{Debreu economy.
Bisin et al. (2011) considered a model of an exchange economy where agents (consumers) can make a
limited amount of delivery contracts, related to their endowments and resale upper bounds.3 However,
if we consider a production economy, there is no natural counterpart for these supply and resale upper
bounds for producers. In this paper, we show that an equilibrium may not exist if producers have no limit
on delivery contracts, even if consumers do (Example 1); that an equilibrium exists if each agent has an
exogenously given upper bound for delivery contracts (Theorem 1); and that, unfortunately, the equilibria
typically depend on the exogenous upper bound if the asymmetric information does actually have an eect
(Proposition 1). The optimality property implies that we cannot treat asymmetric information problems
endogenously in this type of model. Therefore, we extended the model by introducing technologies
that represent some costs related to the delivery contract. We show that an equilibrium exists in this
extended model (Theorem 2) and therefore that all the conditions for the market viability problem can
be endogenized.
1 See also Dubey et al. (2000) and their earlier draft, Dubey et al. (1989).
2 The authors have investigated a static general competitive equilibrium model independently from these recent works
(Urai and Yoshimachi (2005)).
3 Previously mentioned work also used these kinds of upper bounds for delivery contracts.
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2 Basic Model and Equilibrium
Let R denote the set of real numbers, let Rn denote n-dimensional Euclidean space, let Rn+ be the
non-negative orthant of Rn, fx = (xk)nk=1 2 Rnjxk = 0; k = 1; : : : ; ng, and let Rn++ be the strictly
positive orthant of Rn, fx = (xk)nk=1 2 Rnjxk > 0; k = 1; : : : ; ng. For any vectors x; y 2 R`, we let
x = y :, x  y 2 R`+ and x y :, x  y 2 R`++. For each nite set A, we let ]A denote the number of
elements in A.
Contract Structure (Market Structure): There are ` types of real commodities (goods and
services) indexed by k = 1; : : : ; `. Let L be the set of real commodity indices f1; 2; : : : ; `g. We introduce
a partition M:= fL1; : : : ; Lg of L, i.e., L =
S
=1 L and L \ L0 = ; for all ; 0 2 f1; : : : ; g with
 6= 0, and call M a contract structure. Using this apparatus, we describe the situation where the
market does not distinguish between real commodities k and k0 if k; k0 2 L for some L 2M.4 In other
words, there are  types of marketed contract indexed by  = 1; : : : ; , in this situation. The market
must evaluate  types of marketed contracts, so the price space is a subset of -dimensional Euclidean
space R, instead of `-dimensional space. As we describe below, all types of real commodities k 2 L
are evaluated using an identical price p ( = 1; : : : ; ). We also assume, without loss of generality, that
L 6= ; for all  = 1;    ; .
Agents as sellers under a contract strucuture: There are m types of consumers and n types
of producers, indexed by i = 1; : : : ;m and j = 1; : : : ; n, respectively. In the general equilibrium model,
an agent can be a buyer in some markets and a seller in others. In our model, we also assume that
agents can distinguish real commodities when they deliver to the markets, but as buyers they follow
the market's common contract structure. Hence, we treat their behaviors (consumption or production)
in a dierent way to their transactions (demand and supply). More precisely, we describe consumption
xi (i = 1; : : : ;m) and production yj (j = 1; : : : ; n) as points of R
`; and demand z i (i = 1; : : : ;m+n) and
supply z+i (i = 1; : : : ;m+n) as points of R

+. Moreover, we assume that supply plans z
+
i = (z
+
i1; : : : ; z
+
i)
must satisfy
(z+i1; : : : ; z
+
i) =
  X
k2L1
vik; : : : ;
X
k2L
vik

;
where (vi1; : : : ; vik; : : : ; vi`) 2 R`+ is a bundle of real commodities that agent i decides to deliver to the
market. This equation describes the situation where agents can distinguish their delivery, but the market
does not distinguish between real commodities k and k0 if k; k0 2 L for each L 2M.
Agents as buyers and expectations of real receipts: As described above, in our setting, marketed
contract  in the market is really a mixture of ]L kinds of real commodities. Therefore, we assume that
buyers have a certain kind of expectation on their real receipts for each of their demanding contracts when
4 We assume that each commodity k is traded in exactly one contract market, . Although a more general contract
structure M^ is possible, in most standard economic settings such as adverse selection and signaling, we only need an
exclusive contract structure. See the examples in Bisin et al. (2011) for more information. Moreover, this exclusive
contract structure setting contains the standard Arrow{Debreu economy as a special case with the nest partition:
ff1g; : : : ; f`gg. So, it is a natural assumption.
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they chose their actions. So, we introduce an additional exogenous parameter s = (s1; : : : ; s), which
represents the ratio of the ]L types of real commodities in the total quantity of contracts supplied to the
market  = 1; : : : ; . Formally, for each  = 1; : : : ; , we let RL denote the subspace of R` constructed
by elements with k-th coordinates equal to 0 if k =2 L, that is to say, RL := fx = (xk)`k=1 2 R` jxk =
0 if k =2 L g and we take the expectation s = (s1; : : : ; s) as s 2  := fx = (x1; : : : ; x`) 2
RL+ j
P`
k=1 xk = 1 g for all  = 1; : : : ; . This allows us to parametrize the uncertainty about real
receipts in the same way we treat prices of goods in a conventional general equilibrium analysis.
In summary, in our model, agents' optimization problems have two kinds of macro parameters: price
p = (p1; : : : ; p) and expectations of real receipts s = (s
1; : : : ; s), where p 2  := f(p1; : : : ; p) 2
R+ j
P
=1 p = 1g. These two parameters are determined in equilibrium. Given these two parameters,
agents choose micro variables: consumption or production plan xi/yj ; demand plan z
 
i ; and actual
delivery of real commodities vi (which constitutes the supply plan z
+
i ).
Consumers' problems: Consumer i = 1; : : : ;m has initial endowment !i 2 R` of real commodities,
consumption set Xi  R`, and a utility function ui : Xi ! R. Given a price p 2  and an expectation
of their receipts for each real commodity through the market, s = (s1; : : : ; s) 2 Q=1, consumer i
chooses consumption plan xi with market transaction plans (vi; zi) to solve the following maximization
problem where zi := z
+
i   z i .
max ui(xi) (1)
sub. to
(xi; vi; zi) 2 Xi R`+ R (2)
vi 5 !i; (3)
z+i =
  X
k2L1
vik; : : : ;
X
k2L
vik

; (4)
xi + vi = !i + z
 
i1s
1 +   + z is; (5)
p  z i = p  z+i +
nX
j=1
ijj(p; s); (6)
where j(p; s) is the prot of producer j under price p and expectation s (in the maximization problems
described below), and ij denotes i's share of the prot of producer j (a non-negative real number
satisfying
Pm
i=1 ij = 1 for each j). Formula (2) indicates the domains of the variables; in particular,
consumption plan xi should be taken from the consumption set Xi. Equation (3) express that each
consumer i cannot supply arbitrarily large amounts of real commodities. Equation (4) means that supply
plan z+i consists of the delivery of real commodity vi. Equation (5) says that consumption xi and actual
delivery vi must be covered by the consumer's own endowments !j and purchase z
 
i1s
1+   +z is. Note
that z is
 2 R`+ for  = 1; : : : ;  because s 2   R`+. Finally, Equation (6) is the budget constraint
under p 2 .
In Formula (3), we use !i as an upper bound and express that each consumer (i) cannot supply arbi-
trarily large amounts of real commodities. This assumption seems natural for pure exchange economies,
and was also used in early works like Dubey et al. (2005), Bisin et al. (2011), Correia-da-Silva (2012),
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and Meier et al. (2014). For production economies, however, producers do not have endowments, so
there is no such natural upper bound for producers. Furthermore, Example 1 below shows that without
an upper bound for the producers, an equilibrium may fail to exist even if consumers are bounded as
in Formula (3). Hence, in the basic model, we introduce the upper bound condition (Equation (9)) for
producers' problems using a given upper bound parameter, bj 2 R`++. We can ensure that if all agents
have upper bounds on their actual deliveries, there is an equilibrium under moderate conditions on the
agents characteristics, as shown in Theorem 1.
Producers' problems: Producer j = 1; : : : ; n has production technology Yj  R`. Given two
exogenous parameters, a price p and an expectations of their real receipts s = (s1; : : : ; s), producer j
chooses production plan yj with sales and purchasing plans (vj ; zj) to solve the maximization problem
below.
max p  z+j   p  z j (7)
sub. to
(yj ; vj ; zj) 2 Yj R`+ R; (8)
vj 5 bj ; (9)
z+j =
  X
k2L1
vjk; : : : ;
X
k2L
vjk

; (10)
vj = yj + z
 
j1s
1 +   + z js: (11)
Each of (8){(11) can be interpreted in the same way as in the consumers' problems. In Formula (9),
we use bj = (bj1; : : : ; bj`) 2 R`++ as an exogenously given upper bound, as previously discussed.
Equilibrium: Let E = ((Xi; !i; ui; (ij)nj=1)mi=1; (Yj)nj=1;M) denote the economy described above. An
equilibrium for economy E is ((xi; vi; zi)mi=1; (yj ; vj ; zj)nj=1) 2
Qm
i=1
 
XiR`+R
Qnj=1 YjR`+R
and (p; s) 2 Q=1, which satises (1){(11) and themarket clearing condition (12) with expectation
specication (13) for each  2 f1; : : : ; g:
m+nX
i=1
zi = 0; (12)
Pm+n
i=1 prL(vi)Pm+n
i=1 z
+
i
= s as long as
m+nX
i=1
z+i > 0; (13)
where prL denotes the projection onto subspace R
L of R` for each  = 1; : : : ; , i.e., for each x 2 R`,
the k-th coordinate of prL(x) is 0 if k =2 L and xk if k 2 L. Note that we only consider Eq. (13) whenPm+n
i=1 z
+
i > 0. Hence, if
Pm+n
i=1 z
+
i = 0 we have no restriction on the expectation specications.
As previously mentioned, we cannot ensure the equilibrium exists without the upper bound condition
(9). In the following, we describe a non-existence example. The setting is the same as for the existence
theorem (Theorem 1 below), but without the upper bound condition for the producer (Condition (9)).
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Hence, without the upper bound for the producers, the equilibrium may not exist even if the consumers
are bounded as in Formula (3).
Example 1: Non-existence of equilibrium without the upper bound
Suppose we have two real goods, one consumer, and one producer in an economy. Additionally, suppose
that there is only one market, and hence the two goods are traded at an identical price, p 2 R+. These
agents expect that they will receive s 2 [0; 1] units of the good 1 and (1   s) units of good 2 when
they contract to buy one unit from the market. The producer has technology Y = f(y1; y2) 2 R2 :
y1 5 2y2; y2 = 0g and there is no upper bound on the delivery. (Hence this producer's problem is
specied by Equations (7), (8), (10), and (11)). The consumer has consumption set X = R2+, utility
function u(x1; x2) = 2x1 + x2, and endowment (1; 1), and their actual delivery must be bounded by
their endowment. (This problem is specied by Equations (1){(6) with !i = (1; 1). ) In this economy,
the consumer prefers real good 1 to good 2, and real good 2 is the raw material for the producer. Let
(vp1; vp2; z

p ) and (vc1; vc2; z

c ) denote the producer's and consumer's transaction plans, respectively.
First, note that price p = 0 never constitutes an equilibrium, because the consumer can make innite
purchases, i.e., the consumer problem has no maximum. Next, note that for any price p > 0, the
producer's problem is reduced to maxfpy2j(1   s)z p = y2 = 0 and z p = 0g, and the producer's actual
deliveries are characterized by (vp1; vp2) = (2y2 + sz
 
p ; y2 + (1  s)z p ).5
If p > 0 and s 6= 1, then the producer can get his raw material (real good 2) from the market and make
twice as much product (real good 1) as raw material. Moreover, the prices of these two goods are the
same, p > 0, and there is no upper bound for his delivery, so the producer can make an innite amount of
prot. Indeed, if s 6= 1, then the reduced problem has no maximum because y2 can be made arbitrarily
large by taking z p such that z
 
p = y21 s . Hence, an equilibrium only exists when p > 0 and s = 1.
If p > 0 and s = 1, then the producer expects that he cannot get raw material for production. Hence,
no-production is his optimal production plan. The reduced problem has a maximum (y2 = 0, z
 
p =
arbitrary) with maximum prot  = 0, and the actual deliveries are (vp1; vp2) = (z
 
p ; 0).
6 However, the
consumer wants to exchange endowed good 2 with more preferable good 1 through the market, because
they only expect to get good 1 when they purchase from the market, s = 1. So, in the optimum, vc2 > 0
must hold. Hence, there is a positive delivery of commodity 2 while the agents expect no delivery for
good 2, (1  s) = 0. Therefore, Equation (13) never holds. This means that if p > 0 and s = 1, there is
never an equilibrium. Consequently, no equilibrium exists in this economy.
The above example demonstrates that the upper bound for trade quantity bj is important to the
existence of an equilibrium. The following proposition also shows that it is related to the optimality of
5 To see that the original problem described in (7), (8), (10), and (11) can be reduced to the stated problem that has
two variables (y2 and z
 
p ), we can eliminate the other variables as follows. First, we can eliminate vp1 and vp2 by
substituting vp1 = y1 + sz
 
p and vp2 =  y2 + (1  s)z p into all the relevant restrictions (i.e., substitute (11) into (8)
and (10)). Moreover, we can also eliminate z+p by substituting (10) into the prot function of (7). Finally, if p > 0,
then y1 = 2y2 must hold in an optimum, so we can also eliminate y1 by substituting it into all the relevant restrictions
and the prot function. Then, the reduced problem is actually maxfpy2j(1   s)z p = y2 = 0 and z p = 0g and this
problem is equivalent to the original problem. Moreover, the actual deliveries are characterized by (vp1; vp2) =
(2y2 + sz
 
p ; y2 + (1  s)z p ), by substituting the equation y1 = 2y2 to eliminate y1.
6 Here, we observe that the producer's constraint correspondence does not satisfy upper-semicontinuity at s = 1.
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an equilibrium state. The proof is presented in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. If equilibrium state ((xi ; v

i ; z

i )
m
i=1; (y

j ; v

j ; z

j )
n
j=1; p
; s) satises vi  bi for all
i = 1;    ;m + n and s 2 RL++ for all  = 1;    ; , then equilibrium allocation ((xi )mi=1; (yj )nj=1) is
Pareto-optimal.
Hence, in economies with asymmetric information where Pareto-optimality typically does not hold,
there must be some agent i that delivers some real commodity k with its limit amount bik, or some real
commodity k0 vanishing from the market, sk0 = 0. In this sense, the exogenous parameter bj must be
chosen carefully, so that it has a natural economic interpretation with respect to the particular situation.
Now we state a general-equilibrium existence theorem for production economies with asymmetric
information. Note, in this theorem, we replace (3) with vi 5 bi, where bi 2 R`++ is an arbitrary taken
upper bound for the consumers. In other words, we can ensure that the equilibrium exists if all agents
have an upper bound on their actual deliveries. The proof is essentially the same as in Theorem 2.
Theorem1. Economy E = ((Xi; !i; ui; (ij)nj=1)mi=1; (Yj)nj=1;M) has an equilibrium, ((xi ; vi ; zi )mi=1;
(yj ; v

j ; z

j )
n
j=1; p
; s), if the following conditions are satised.
(Consumers) Each consumer i = 1; : : : ;m has (i) a closed convex consumption set Xi  R`+ that
is bounded from below, (ii) a convex preference induced by a strictly monotone (i.e., x0 = x, x0 6= x
implies ui(x
0) > ui(x) ) and continuous utility function ui : Xi ! R, and (iii) an endowment
!i 2 intXi.
(Producers) For each j = 1; : : : ; n, Yj  R` is a closed convex set that contains 0.
(Attainable Set) The attainable sets for each agents are bounded.7
However, as shown in Proposition 1, the equilibrium typically depends on the exogenous upper bound,
bi. In the next section, we endogenize this upper bound by introducing some technologies for integrating
the costs for standardizing real commodities into the contract structure M.
3 Extended Model and Existence Theorem
Given a contract structure M= fL1; : : : ; Lg, each agent must sell their real goods as  types of
market contracts. Therefore, they should standardize real goods to sell in the market depending on
the contract structure, M. This procedure may cost each agent some loss in terms of the delivery
amount. We describe such situations by assuming that each agent has a certain kind of technology for
standardizing real goods in their contract structureM. For example, the function dened on R`+ to R+
as (v1; : : : ; v`) 7! (
P
k2L1 vk;    ;
P
k2L vk) may be a candidate for such a technology. (Note that we
have implicitly adopted this \technology" in the basic model. See Conditions (4) and (10).) We can
7 We say a real state ((xi)
n
i=1; (yj)
m
j=1) is attainable if
Pn
i=1 xi 5
Pm
j=1 yj+
Pn
i=1 !i. The attainable sets for each agent
i = 1; : : : ; n +m are dened as ~Xi := fxi 2 Xi jxi constitutes an attainable real state with some xi0 2 Xi0 (8i0 6=
i); yj 2 Yj (8j = 1; : : : ;m)g and ~Yj := fyj 2 Yj j yj constitutes an attainable real state with some xi 2 Xi (8i =
1; : : : ; n); yj0 2 Yj0 (8j0 6= j)g.
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say that an agent with this technology can standardize real goods at no cost. However, in a real-world
market economy, no one can standardize and supply their goods at no cost. Therefore, we include some
natural restrictions on these standardizing technologies.
Assume that each agent i = 1; : : : ; n+m has a function Fi : R
`
+ ! R`+, which satises the conditions:8
(C1) Fi is a continuous function;
(C2) for all k = 1; : : : ; `, Fik is a concave function, where Fik is k-th coordinate of Fi;
(C3) for all k = 1; : : : ; `, Fik is strictly monotone, i.e., v
0 = v and v0 6= v implies Fik(v0) > Fik(v);
(C4) Fi(v) 5 v for all v 2 R`+; and
(C5) for each  such that L = fkg for some k, Fik(v) := vk; for each  such that ]L = 2, and for
each sequence fvg1=1  R`+, if
P
k2L Fik(v
) ! 1 ( ! 1) then there exists some L0 such
that
P
k2L[L0 (v

k   Fik(v))!1 ( !1).
We call Fi for i = 1; : : : ; n+m agent i's standardizing technology. Condition (C5) implies that each agent
cannot sell their real goods in the market with contract structure M =fL1; : : : ; Lg at no cost.9 Note
that (C5) requires these standardizing costs only if L is not a singleton set. If some L is a singleton,
then there is no dierence between a real good and a market contract in the corresponding market.
Therefore, in such cases, the argument about standardizing costs reduces to the argument about usual
production costs. Condition (C5) expresses this point using the case ]L = 1, i.e., L = fkg for some
k. Using Fi : R
`
+ ! R`+, we can remove the exogenous upper bound conditions (3) and (9). Agents
choose to deliver vi so that the standardizing cost represented by Fi : R
`
+ ! R`+ never harms their own
total payo. In other words, the upper bound for delivery is endogenous. Now, we propose the following
modications to the model.
Agents' Problems: The formalization is almost the same as above in Equations (1){(11), except
that we remove (3) and (9) and replace (4) and (10) by z+i = (
P
k2L1 Fik(vi); : : : ;
P
k2L Fik(vi)).
Explicitly, the producers' problems are dened as:
max p  z+j   p  z j (14)
sub. to
(yj ; vj ; zj) 2 (Yj R`+ R); (15)
z+j =
  X
k2L1
Fjk(vj); : : : ;
X
k2L
Fjk(vj)

; (16)
vj = yj + z
 
j1s
1 +   + z js: (17)
8 As we will formalize later, each agent supplies their real goods and services to the market as a -tuple
(
P
k2L1 Fik(v); : : : ;
P
k2L Fik(v)) 2 R+.
9 Our \candidate" technology (v1; : : : ; v`) 7! (
P
k2L1 vk;    ;
P
k2L vk) mentioned above corresponds to the case
where Fi is the identity function Fi(v1; : : : ; v`) := (v1; : : : ; v`). In this case, all of the conditions are satised except
for (C5). Therefore, in this setting, we cannot ensure the existence of an equilibrium. In particular, in the basic
model, we can construct a non-existence example, similar to Example 1.
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Similarly, the consumers' problems are dened as:
max ui(xi) (18)
sub. to
(xi; vi; zi) 2 (Xi R`+ R); (19)
z+i =
  X
k2L1
Fik(vi); : : : ;
X
k2L
Fik(vi)

; (20)
xi + vi = !i + z
 
i1s
1 +   + z is; (21)
p  z i = p  z+i +
nX
j=1
ijj(p; s): (22)
Equilibrium: Let E = ((Xi; !i; ui; Fi; (ij)nj=1)mi=1; (Yj ; Fj)nj=1;M) denote the economy described
above. An equilibrium for economy E is represented by ((xi; vi; zi)mi=1; (yj ; vj ; zj)nj=1) and (p; s), which
satises (14){(22) and the market clearing condition (23) with expectation specication (24) for each
 2 f1; : : : ; g and k 2 L:
m+nX
i=1
zi = 0; (23)
Pm+n
i=1 Fik(vi)Pm+n
i=1 z
+
i
= sk as long as
m+nX
i=1
z+i > 0: (24)
We state the existence theorem for this modied economy. The proof is presented in the next section.
Theorem2. Economy E = ((Xi; !i; ui; Fi; (ij)nj=1)mi=1; (Yj ; Fj)nj=1;M) has an equilibrium, ((xi ; zi ;
vi )
m
i=1; (y

j ; z

j ; v

j )
n
j=1; p
; s), if the following conditions are satised.
(Consumers) Each consumer i = 1; : : : ;m has a non-empty closed convex consumption set Xi 
R`+ that is bounded from below with a convex preference induced by a strictly monotone (i.e.,
x0 = x, x0 6= x implies ui(x0) > ui(x)) and continuous utility function ui : Xi ! R+, and an
initial endowment !i 2 intXi.
(Producers) For each j = m+ 1; : : : ;m+ n, Yj  R` is a closed convex set containing 0.
(Attainable Set) The attainable sets for each agents ( ~Xi (i = 1; : : : ;m) or ~Yj (j = 1; : : : ; n) ) are
bounded.10
(Standardizing Technologies) Each function Fi : R
`
+ ! R`+; i = 1; : : : ;m + n satises condi-
tions (C1) { (C5).
4 Proof of Theorems
Here, we make some notes regarding the proof of Theorem 1. Theorem 1 corresponds to the case
Fi(vi) = vi for all vi 2 fv 2 R`+jv 5 big in the extended standardizing technology setting of the previous
10 For the denitions of ~Xi and ~Yj , see footnote 7 of Theorem 1.
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section. This Fi satises (C1){(C4) on the compact domain fv 2 R`+jv 5 big. Although it does not
satisfy (C5), this assumption is not needed if the domain of Fi is compact on R
`. (Footnote 11 of this
section claried this point.)
Now, we proceed to the proof of Theorem 2. There are some diculties related to the original prob-
lems (14){(22). In particular, we cannot ensure that the constraint correspondences satisfy upper and
lower semicontinuity and have convex values. More specically, the diculty related to the upper semi-
continuity is due to non-bounded deliveries, and was observed in Example 1. Next, the equality constrains
(17) and (21) cause some diculties in showing the lower semi-continuity with respect to the vector val-
ued parameters s = (s1; : : : ; s). Finally, the equality constraints (16) and (20) create problems when
ensuring the convexity of the values of the constraint correspondences, because Fi (i = 1; : : : ; n+m) are
generally not linear.
To avoid these diculties, we modied the original problems in two ways. We truncated the variables
and relaxed the constraints. Subsequently, the xed point (which we obtained as the modied problem's
\equilibrium") is actually an equilibrium of the original model. In particular, we can see that the
\upper bound condition for deliveries" is endogenized through the cost conditions of the standardizing
technologies (C5), in the limit of the truncation argument.
Producers: Take an arbitrarily large number t > 0. We consider a modied version of the original
problem (14){(17). Specically, we replace the variable constraint (15) by the following restricted version:
(yj ; vj ; zj) 2 (Yj R`+ R) \ ([ t; t]`  [0; t]`  [ t; t]):
Moreover, we relax the constraints (16) and (17) by replacing equalities equalities \= " by inequalities
\5 ". We refer those two relaxed modied conditions as (16') and (17'), respectively, and let 
t denote
as

t := [ t; t]`  [0; t]`  [ t; t]:
Note that each real technology Yj  R`, j = 1; : : : ; n, is assumed to be closed and convex, and to contain
0, with Fj satisfying (C1) { (C5).
We denote by tj(p; s) the set of solutions to the modied maximization problem; (14) subject to (15),
(16'), and (17') under (p; s). The non-emptiness, closedness, and convexity of tj(p; s) are clear. (In
particular, the convexity is now assured since we relax the equality constraint (16) by the inequality
condition (16') and Fik is a concave function for each k = 1; : : : ; ` from the assumption (C2).) We can
also prove that the correspondence tj : 
Q
=1
 ! 
t has a closed graph. Indeed, rst, we can see
that the constraint correspondence
(p; s) 7! f (yj ; vj ; zj) 2 
t j (yj ; vj ; zj) satises (15), (16'), and (17') under (p; s) g
has a closed graph and that its value and range are compact. (The compactness of the value is now
assured since we truncate the variables and hence the diculty on upper semi-continuity which we pointed
out in Example 1 can be avoided. Note also that the continuity of Fj , condition (C1), are used here.)
Therefore, the constraint correspondence is upper semi-continuous. Next, it is clear that the constraint
correspondence is lower semi-continuous because Fj is strictly monotone from (C3) and constraints
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are inequality and hence, the standard argument is applicable. Thus the constraint correspondence is
continuous. Therefore, Berge's maximum theorem (cf. Debreu (1959, p. 19, Theorem (4))) is applicable.
In this case, it is simultaneously conrmed that the prot function of this truncated problem, tj(p; s),
is continuous.
Consumers: As in the producer case, we consider the modied version of the original problem (18){
(22). Namely, variables are constrained as (xi; vi; zi) 2 (Xi R`+ R)\
t and all the equalities \="
in constrains (20){(22) are replaced by inequalities \5 ". Moreover, we replace each prot j(p; s) in
Eq. (22) by tj(p; s), which are the maximized prots of producers in the modied maximization problem
we argued above. We refer those inequality conditions as (20'), (21'), and (22'), respectively. Denote
by ti(p; s) the set of all solutions to the modied maximization problem; (18) subject to (19), (20'){
(22') under (p; s). The correspondence ti :  
Q
=1
 ! 
t is non-empty closed convex valued
and has a closed graph. (The argument is almost the same as the producer case. The non-emptiness,
closedness, and convexity of ti(p; s) are easy to conrm. For the closed graph of 
t
i , check that the
constraint correspondence (p; s) 7! f (xi; vi; zi) 2 
t j (xi; vi; zi) satises (19), (20'){(22') under (p; s) g is
continuous. Then apply Berge's maximum theorem again. The truncation and relaxation of the original
problems are utilized here as in the produce case.)
Fixed Points and Limit Arguments: Take a number t > 0 suciently large so that the bounded
attainable sets, ~Xi  R` and ~Yj  R`, to be a subset of the interior of [ t; t]`, and consider the
modied maximization problems we described above. We have dened solution correspondences ti :
 Q=1 ! 
t and tj :  Q=1 ! 
t for these problems. Consider the product map  of
these correspondences:
 : 
Y
=1
 3 (p; s) 7!
mY
i=1
ti(p; s) 
nY
j=1
tj(p; s)  (
t)m+n: (25)
The mapping  has a closed graph. Now, dene a price-expectation manipulation correspondence 	 as
follows:
	 : ([0; t]`  [ t; t])m+n 3 (vi; zi)m+ni=1 7! ((zi)m+ni=1 ) ((vi)m+ni=1 )  
Y
=1
; (26)
where  is the price manipulation mapping and  is the correspondence that assigns the real mixture
ratio of the goods for each market. More precisely, we dene
((zi)
m+n
i=1 ) := fp 2  j 8q 2 ; q 
m+nX
i=1
zi = p 
m+nX
i=1
zig
for each (zi)
n+m
i=1 , and the -th coordinate of  by
((vi)
m+n
i=1 ) :=
Pm+n
i=1 prL(Fi(vi))Pm+n
i=1 (
P
k2L Fik(vi) )
; (27)
as long as
Pm+n
i=1 (
P
k2L Fik(vi) ) 6= 0, and otherwise by ((vi)m+ni=1 ) :=  for each (vi)m+ni=1 . (We use
the notation prL for the projection onto subspace R
L of R` for each  = 1; : : : ; .) Note that the right
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hand side of Eq. (27) is always an element of  when
Pm+n
i=1
 P
k2L Fik(vi)
 6= 0. It is routine to check
that  and  are non-empty closed convex valued correspondence with a closed graph. In particular, 
has a closed graph since the right hand side of Eq. (27) is continuous when
Pm+n
i=1
 P
k2L Fik(vi)
 6= 0.
Now, the product of the mappings  and 	,
	 :    Y
=1

 (
t)m+n !    Y
=1

 (
t)m+n; (28)
is a non-empty closed convex valued correspondence with a closed graph. By Kakutani's xed point
theorem, 	 has a xed point ( pt; st; (xti; vti ; zti)mi=1; (ytj ; vtj ; ztj)nj=1 ).
Here, note that Walras' Law; pt  (Pn+mi=1 zti) = 0 holds from the condition (14) and (22). (Note
that (22') holds with equality since consumers' utility function is strictly monotone and st 2Q=1.)
Hence, by the denition of , the summation of (zti)
m+n
i=1 must satisfy that
q  (
m+nX
i=1
zti) = pt  (
m+nX
i=1
zti) = 0 for all q 2 :
Therefore, for each  = 1; : : : ; , the -th coordinates of (
Pm+n
i=1 z
t
i) must satisfy that
m+nX
i=1
zti = 0
and
m+nX
i=1
zti > 0 if and only if p
t
 = 0: (29)
On the other hand, since (18), (C3), and that consumers' utility functions are strictly monotone, pt  0
must hold and hence (29) implies
Pm+n
i=1 z
t
i = 0; the market clearing condition (23) holds. Moreover,
pt  0 implies that all the inequality constraints in the modied problems, (16'), (17'), (20'), (21'),
and (22'), hold with equality since if not, a contradiction to utility/prot maximization follows; (16),
(17), (20), (21), and (22) hold with the xed point ( pt; st; (xti; v
t
i ; z
t
i)
m
i=1; (y
t
j ; v
t
j ; z
t
j)
n
j=1 ). Therefore, in
particular, (24) follows from (16), (20), and (27).
Thus far, we see that the state
 
pt; st; (xti; v
t
i ; z
t
i)
m
i=1; (y
t
j ; v
t
j ; z
t
j)
n
j=1

satises (16), (17), (20), (21), (24),
and
Pm+n
i=1 z
t
i = 0. Hence, it follows that the real state ((xti)mi=1; (ytj)nj=1) satises
Pm
i=1 x
t
i 5
Pn
j=1 y
t
j +Pm
i=1 !i, or that x
t
i and y
t
j are in the attainable sets which are bounded. We call
 
pt; st; (xti; v
t
i ; z
t
i)
m
i=1,
(ytj ; v
t
j ; z
t
j)
n
j=1

a t-quasi-equilibrium state. Since we take t > 0 suciently large for the bounded attain-
able sets to be subsets of the interior of [ t; t]`, all xti or ytj are interior points of [ t; t]`. Therefore, the t-
quasi-equilibrium state
 
pt; st; (xti; v
t
i ; z
t
i)
m
i=1, (y
t
j ; v
t
j ; z
t
j)
n
j=1

is not an equilibrium of the original economy
E only when (vti ; zti) 2 [0; t]` [ t; t] is a boundary point of [0; t]` [ t; t] for some i = 1; : : : ;m+n.11
Suppose that, for some i = 1; : : : ;m + n, (vti ; z
t
i) is a boundary point of [0; t]
`  [ t; t] for all t > 0.
If some market  consists of a single real commodity k, L = fkg, then sk = 1 and restriction (21)
11 If the domain of Fi is compact for all i = 1; : : : ;m + n then (vi; zi) (i = 1; : : : ; n +m) are in a xed bounded area
by the continuity of Fi (i = 1; : : : ; n +m). Hence, in such cases, the proof is completed here. As we noted in the
previous section, the proof of Theorem 1 corresponds to this case.
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requires that xtik + v
t
ik = !ik + z
t 
i . (The same argument is relevant for producerss.) Therefore, we can
also suppose that (vtik; z
t
) is bounded for such singleton markets L without loss of generality, since we
can decrease the amounts of (vtik; z
t 
i ) without any change of utility value (and/or prot value) of i or
any harm in conditions we get so far. This implies that kPk2L Fik(vti)k ! 1 as t ! 1 for some
 2 f1; : : : ; g such that ]L = 2. Note rst that
mX
i=1
  X
k2L[L0
(!ik   xtik)

+
nX
j=1
  X
k2L[L0
ytik

=
  X
k2L[L0
vtik
  (zt+i + zt+i0) (30)
holds for all i = 1; : : : ;m + n and all ; 0 = 1; : : : ;  by considering conditions (16), (17), (20), (21),
(23), (24),
Pm+n
i=1 z
t
i = 0, and (C4). Moreover, the right hand side of Eq. (30) equals
P
k2L[L0 v
t
ik  P
k2L[L0 Fik(v
t
i), from conditions (16) and (20). However, if k
P
k2L Fik(v
t
i)k ! 1 as t ! 1 for
some  2 f1; : : : ; g such that ]L = 2, then condition (C5) requires that there exists some L0 such tahtP
k2L[L0 v
t
ik  
P
k2L[L0 Fik(v
t
i) ! 1 as t ! 1. This implies that the right-hand side and hence
the left-hand side of Eq. (30) tend to 1 as t!1, contradicting the fact that xti and ytj are bounded.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose, on the contrary, that there is an allocation ((xi)
m
i=1; (yj)
n
j=1) which
Pareto-dominates ((xi )
m
i=1; (y

j )
n
j=1). Take (vi; zi) 2 R`+  R (i = 1;    ;m + n) to satisfy conditions
(4), (5), (10), and (11) with allocation xi or yi.
12 Note, here, that (3) and/or (9) are not necessarily
satised. Since we assume that vi  bi for all i = 1;    ;m + n, we can construct state ((xi; vi; zi)mi=1;
(yj ; vj ; zj)
n
j=1) such that ((xi)
m
i=1; (yj)
n
j=1) is feasible and Pareto-dominates the equilibrium allocation
and satises conditions (3), (4), (5), (9), (10), and (11). (For example, if we denote (xi; vi; zi) =
(1   t)(xi ; vi ; zi ) + t(xi; vi; zi) and let t ! 0, then vi  bi, in particular condition (3) (or (9)), holds
for suciently small t. By taking a suciently small and identical t for all agents i = 1;    ;m + n
we can construct a feasible state ((xi)
m
i=1; (yj)
n
j=1) that satises these conditions. Pareto-dominance is
particularly preserved since each consumer's preference is convex.)
Note that the following two conditions hold:
ui(xi) > ui(x

i ) =) p  z i > p  z+i +
nX
j=1
ijj(p
; s) (31)
ui(xi) = ui(xi ) =) p  z i = p  z+i +
nX
j=1
ijj(p
; s) (32)
(where j(p
; s) is the maximized prot of producer j = 1;    ; n under (p; s)) since, if not, we have a
contradiction to the fact that xi is a utility maximizing consumption plan under (p
; s), s 2 RL++ for all
, and each consumer's preference is monotone. Hence, the Pareto-dominance of ((xi)
m
i=1; (yj)
n
j=1) with
(31), (32), and the prot maximization assumption of the equilibrium state implies that
Pm
i=1 p
  zi >
12 Since we assume s 2 RL++ for all  = 1;    ; , we can take z i and vi to satisfy condition (5) (or (11)) with for
each i = 1;    ;m+ n. Then, take z+i to satisfy (4) (or (10)).
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Pn
j=1 p
  zj holds. We can rewrite this inequality as follows:13
mX
i=1
nX
k2L1
p1(!ik   xik) +   +
X
k2L
p(!ik   xik)
o
>
nX
j=1
nX
k2L1
p1yjk +   +
X
k2L
pyjk
o
: (33)
However, (33) contradicts the fact that ((xi)
m
i=1; (yj)
n
j=1) is feasible. Indeed, if we dene ?extended
price?p = (p1; : : : ; p`) 2 R` as pk = p if k 2 L (k = 1; : : : ; `,  = 1; : : : ; ) and evaluate feasibility
condition
Pm
i=1(xi   !i) =
Pn
j=1 yj by extended price p, then (33) must hold with equality.
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